How can and should "why punish" issues influence the "who" and "how" of sentencing?

As we transition to a discussion of the "who" and "how" of sentencing — beginning with a deep dive into the 1949 case Williams v. New York — you should be giving particular thought to how a sentencing system can and should integrate its basic "why punish" commitments into its sentencing process.  You should see how the Williams ruling was driven in part by the punishment theories of the time: the "prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime" and "the belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship." 

The class survey indicated a strong affinity for prioritizing rehabilitation and deterrence as theories of punishment.  If Ohio was to make these punishment theories predominant, which actors in the criminal justice system should have the most sentencing authority?  Which should have the least?  Should the answer to "who" sentences change if a jurisdiction prioritizes retribution or incapacitation?  What if it does not prioritize any particular theory?